The provision that was Section 482 of the old Code — and which is not the new Section 482. The grounds on which an FIR is quashed, how a matrimonial case ends after a settlement even though the offence cannot be compounded, what the Delhi High Court actually asks for, and the cheaper routes people overlook.
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 saves the inherent powers of the High Court — to give effect to any order under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is the provision under which an FIR, a charge-sheet or an entire criminal proceeding is quashed.
It is the old Section 482 CrPC, word for word, with "Code" replaced by "Sanhita". Every decision under the old section continues to apply.
The new Section 482 BNSS is anticipatory bail. The two numbers have swapped. If a page tells you to file "a 482" to quash your FIR, it is describing the repealed Code.
Only the High Court has this power. A Sessions Court or a Magistrate cannot quash. What they can do is discharge you — a different application, with a different test, under Sections 250, 262 or 268 of the BNSS depending on the kind of case.
The grounds come from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) — seven categories, to be applied "very sparingly". And where the parties have settled, quashing under Section 528 is often the only way a matrimonial case can end, because Section 85 BNS is not compoundable and the trial court therefore cannot close it.
Almost nothing about this section changed in substance. What changed is its number, and the number it swapped with is the one every Indian has heard of.
| What you want to do | Old law (till 30 June 2024) | New law (from 1 July 2024) |
|---|---|---|
| Quash an FIR or proceedings — inherent powers of the High Court | Section 482 CrPC | Section 528 BNSS |
| Anticipatory bail — protection from arrest | Section 438 CrPC | Section 482 BNSS |
| High Court and Sessions Court powers regarding bail | Section 439 CrPC | Section 483 BNSS |
| High Court's power of superintendence | Section 483 CrPC | Section 529 BNSS |
| Revision — High Court | Section 401 CrPC | Section 442 BNSS |
There is no other inherent-powers provision in the BNSS. Section 529 is superintendence, Section 530 deals with proceedings in electronic mode, and Section 531 is repeal and savings. Section 442 is the High Court's revisional power, which is statutory rather than inherent and has a narrower reach.
"Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
The section does not create a power. It saves one — it says that nothing in the Sanhita limits a power the High Court already has. That framing explains why the power is so wide and why courts are so careful with it.
Three purposes are named, and they are not interchangeable:
The High Courts have noted that Section 528 uses the same language as Section 482 of the old Code, and the Supreme Court now cites the two together in a single breath. In practice this means the entire body of law built over decades under Section 482 CrPC applies unchanged.
A practical question that comes up constantly. Your FIR is from 2021 under the IPC; the BNSS came into force in July 2024; under which provision do you file?
The savings provision in the BNSS preserves the old Code for matters that were pending at the changeover. The majority view among the High Courts that have considered it is that the date the petition is filed governs — so a petition filed now proceeds under Section 528 BNSS even where the FIR and the offence are older. At least one High Court has taken a different view. In Delhi, benches have been deciding such petitions under Section 528 even where the FIR dates from 2021 or 2022.
The practical answer practitioners have settled on is to title the petition under Section 528 BNSS read with Section 482 CrPC where applicable, which covers the point either way. Your advocate will know the current practice at the filing counter.
The framework every quashing petition is argued within comes from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), where the Supreme Court set out seven categories by way of illustration.
| # | The category | What it looks like in practice |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The allegations, taken at face value and in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence | The FIR describes conduct that is unpleasant but not criminal |
| 2 | The FIR and the accompanying material disclose no cognizable offence justifying investigation | Police investigating something that needed a Magistrate's order |
| 3 | The uncontroverted allegations plus the evidence collected disclose no offence | Argued after the charge-sheet, on the charge-sheet's own material |
| 4 | Only a non-cognizable offence is disclosed, and it was investigated without a Magistrate's order | Relevant, for example, where the only offence alleged is bigamy |
| 5 | The allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could reach a just conclusion on them | A high bar — improbability is not enough, it must be inherent |
| 6 | There is an express legal bar to the proceeding, or a specific alternative remedy in the statute | Sanction not obtained; complaint by a person not competent to complain |
| 7 | The proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide, or maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance | The hardest to prove, and the most often pleaded |
The Supreme Court added that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding "should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases."
That caution is not decoration. It is the sentence the State will quote at you, and the reason a quashing petition should be filed on a category, not on a grievance.
| Stage | Realistic prospects |
|---|---|
| FIR registered, investigation on | Possible, but the court has the least material and is most reluctant. Works where the FIR on its own face discloses no offence, or where there is a legal bar |
| Charge-sheet filed, cognizance taken | Often the better moment. The court can now test the allegations against the material actually collected — the third Bhajan Lal category |
| Charges framed | Harder. The trial court has already applied its mind; a discharge application may have been the right route |
| Trial concluded, or appeal dismissed | Not impossible. The Supreme Court held in Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) that a non-heinous proceeding may be annulled on a settlement even where the trial has concluded or an appeal against conviction has been dismissed |
The rule is that the High Court does not hold a mini trial at the quashing stage. It does not weigh competing versions and it does not decide whether the complainant is telling the truth. That is the trial's work.
There is a narrow exception, from Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013): material of sterling and impeccable quality that, by itself, demolishes the allegation and cannot sensibly be disputed. The test is demanding, and the four steps it sets out must all be satisfied.
What clears the bar in practice is documentary and official — records whose authenticity the prosecution cannot realistically contest. What does not clear it is your account of events, however coherent, and the statements of your own witnesses.
One of the most reliable grounds, and one of the most common real situations: a recovery dispute, a property disagreement or a business fallout is converted into an FIR for cheating or criminal breach of trust, because a criminal case brings pressure that a civil suit does not.
On an FIR that had been "given a criminal colour", the Court said: "The machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance."
The argument works when it is made structurally — by showing from the FIR itself that what is described is the breach of a contract or the non-payment of a debt, with the ingredient of dishonest intention at the time of the transaction simply asserted rather than particularised. It does not work as a general complaint that the other side is being unreasonable.
This is the part of Section 528 that matters most to families, and it is the part most pages leave out entirely.
| Decision | What it settled |
|---|---|
| B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) | The High Court may quash matrimonial proceedings where the parties have settled, even though the offence is not compoundable |
| Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), three judges | The foundational case. Quashing on a settlement is not compounding; the High Court's inherent power is not limited by the compounding list. Quashable: offences with an overwhelmingly civil flavour, and offences arising out of matrimony and family disputes |
| Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) | Working guidelines on when the power should and should not be exercised, including the relevance of the stage of the proceedings |
| Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) | Consolidates the principles into a single list, and adds that economic offences affecting the public are outside the settlement route |
| Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) | The power runs beyond the limits of the compounding provision, and may be exercised even after conviction in a non-heinous matter |
"Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable."
Here is the mechanism, and it is worth following carefully because it is the single most useful thing on this page.
Compounding — the parties formally settling an offence before the trial court — is available only for the offences listed in the compounding provision of the BNSS. That provision is explicit that no offence may be compounded except as it allows. Section 85 BNS — cruelty by a husband or his relatives, the old Section 498A — appears in neither list.
So when a couple settles, divorces by mutual consent and both sides want the criminal case to end, the Magistrate cannot end it. There is no application that will work. The only route is a petition to the High Court under Section 528 asking it to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the basis of the settlement — which is exactly the power Gian Singh confirmed.
The line the courts draw is between offences that are essentially private in their impact and offences against society. Settlement does not reach the second group.
| Ordinarily quashable on settlement | Ordinarily not |
|---|---|
| Offences with an overwhelmingly civil flavour — commercial, financial, property, partnership disputes | Murder, rape, dacoity |
| Matrimonial and family disputes, including cruelty and dowry-related allegations | Offences the courts describe as showing mental depravity |
| Neighbour and personal disputes that escalated | Corruption and offences by public servants |
| Simple assault and similar personal offences | Economic offences affecting a wide section of the public |
Drawn from orders passed in settlement-based quashing petitions. This is not a statutory checklist — it is what the court in fact looks for.
| What the court wants | Why |
|---|---|
| A written settlement or memorandum of understanding | So the terms are on record and capable of being verified |
| Proof that the settlement has been performed | The most important item. Petitions have been refused in terms because the settlement "was never implemented or executed" |
| The decree of divorce by mutual consent, where the parties have separated | Shows the settlement was carried through to its end |
| Both parties present, and identified by the investigating officer | Orders record the IO identifying the parties by name and rank. This is standard Delhi practice |
| The complainant's own statement that she does not wish to pursue the proceedings | Recorded in the order; it is her statement, not her counsel's |
| An express finding that the settlement was free | Orders record that the parties settled "out of their own free will and without any coercion" |
| Status report from the SHO | Settled Delhi practice rather than a statutory requirement |
The complainant is generally expected in person. Co-petitioners — most often in-laws living in another State — have joined by video conferencing while the main parties attended in court, with the investigating officer identifying everyone. Orders in Delhi record exactly this arrangement. It is not a right, and the bench decides; confirm the position for your matter before anyone travels.
Anyone reading only the 2012 to 2017 cases would come away thinking a settlement is close to a formality. The last two years have moved noticeably the other way, and an honest page has to say so.
The petition is a CRL.M.C. — a criminal miscellaneous main petition. Applications within it are CRL.M.A.s. The State, through the Government of NCT of Delhi, is the first respondent; the complainant is the second. The prayer is to quash the numbered FIR of the named police station and all proceedings emanating from it — that last phrase matters, because without it the charge-sheet and the trial-court proceedings survive the order.
The Delhi High Court runs a mediation and conciliation centre, and the district courts run their own. Matrimonial matters reach them by two routes: the parties settle at a district mediation centre first and then file the quashing petition annexing that settlement; or the petition is filed and the court refers the parties to mediation.
Both are ordinary. What is not correct is the claim, made on some websites, that a mediation referral is a precondition to a settlement-based quashing petition. It is not. A settlement recorded before a mediation centre is useful evidence that the settlement was genuine and voluntary — which is exactly what the court is looking for — but the petition does not depend on it.
There is no fixed tariff, and anyone who quotes you one is guessing.
Many settlement-based quashing petitions in Delhi are allowed without any costs at all. In some orders the court has directed a modest deposit with the Delhi State Legal Services Authority — figures of the order of five or ten thousand rupees per petitioner appear in reported orders, payable within a stated period with proof of deposit filed. Where the court has found that it was misled, costs have been punitive rather than nominal.
Separately from costs, there is the court fee and the professional fee, and the second is by far the larger. Ask for it in writing, broken into drafting, appearances and the final hearing.
This page explains the law in general terms. It cannot tell you what to do about your own facts — only an advocate who has read your papers can do that. You can look through the advocates associated with Legal Space Services who practise in criminal and matrimonial matters, see their enrolment details and areas of practice, and send a consultation request. Searching and sending a request are free.
The section says "the High Court". Nothing in the BNSS confers inherent powers on any court below it, and the Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate has no inherent power even to recall his own order — the remedy in such a case is the High Court.
Websites that tell you a Sessions Court can quash an FIR are wrong, and acting on that costs a filing. But the trial courts are not powerless. What they have is discharge, and for many people it is the better application: it is cheaper, it is heard by a court that already has the file, and its test — whether there is sufficient ground to proceed on the prosecution's own material — is not the demanding "rarest of rare" test.
| Relief | BNSS | Old CrPC | Which court | Stage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quashing — inherent powers | 528 | 482 | High Court only | Any stage |
| Discharge — sessions trial | 250 | 227 | Court of Session | After charge-sheet, before charge |
| Discharge — warrant case on a police report | 262 | 239 | Magistrate | After charge-sheet, before charge |
| Discharge — warrant case otherwise than on a police report | 268 | 245 | Magistrate | Before charge |
| Summons cases — stopping the proceedings | 281 | 258 | Magistrate | During trial. There is no discharge in a summons case |
| Compounding | 359 | 320 | Trial court | Only for the listed offences. BNS 85 is not listed |
| Withdrawal from prosecution | 360 | 321 | Court, on the Public Prosecutor's application | Not in the accused's hands |
| Revision | 438 / 440 / 442 | 397 / 399 / 401 | Sessions Court or High Court | Against an order, not the FIR |
| Appeal from conviction | 415 | 374 | Appellate court | After judgment |
Being blunt about this saves people a great deal of money.
The most common real situation on this page: an FIR names the husband and then his mother, father, sister, brother and their spouses, several of whom live in another city and had little to do with the marriage.
Here the argument is not that the allegations are false. It is that the FIR, on its own terms, says nothing about these individuals — it makes an omnibus allegation against "the in-laws" without attributing a single specific act to any named person. That is the first Bhajan Lal category, and the Supreme Court has quashed such proceedings against distant relatives on exactly this reasoning, in Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) and again in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2024), warning against the tendency to implicate every family member.
To run it, your advocate needs the FIR's own words, paragraph by paragraph, showing what is said about each petitioner. Where the answer is "nothing specific", say so precisely. Where a relative was not even in the same city, the documents proving it may be the sterling material the narrow exception allows.
It preserves the inherent powers of the High Court — the power to make such orders as are necessary to give effect to any order under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is the provision used to quash an FIR, a charge-sheet or a criminal proceeding. It is the old Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Correct, and this is the single most common mistake being made right now. Under the new law, Section 482 BNSS is anticipatory bail (the old CrPC 438), and quashing is Section 528 BNSS. The two most quoted numbers in Indian criminal practice have swapped places.
No. The text is the same but for the word "Code" being replaced by "Sanhita". The High Courts have said so expressly, and the Supreme Court now routinely writes "Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS" together. All the case law decided under the old section continues to apply.
The majority view among High Courts is that the date the petition is filed governs, so a petition filed today goes under Section 528 BNSS even where the FIR is older. In Delhi, benches are deciding such petitions under Section 528. The safe course, which is what practitioners are doing, is to title the petition under Section 528 BNSS read with Section 482 CrPC where applicable.
The seven categories set out by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) remain the framework — broadly, where the allegations even if wholly accepted disclose no offence; where the material collected discloses no offence; where the allegations are so absurd that no prudent person could act on them; where there is an express legal bar; and where the proceeding is malicious and instituted to wreak vengeance. The Court also said the power is to be used very sparingly.
At any stage — before the charge-sheet, after it, after charges are framed, and in some cases even after the trial has concluded. The earlier the stage, the more reluctant the court is to interfere, because at the FIR stage it has the least material in front of it.
Only within a narrow window. The general rule is that the High Court does not conduct a mini trial and does not weigh defence evidence. The exception, from Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013), is material of sterling and impeccable quality that by itself demolishes the allegation and cannot sensibly be disputed. Official records have cleared that bar; a version of events, however convincing, has not.
It is one of the strongest arguments there is. The Supreme Court has repeatedly quashed FIRs where a civil dispute was given a criminal colour, saying in 2025 that the machinery of criminal law cannot be used to settle civil disputes or to wreak vengeance. Recovery, property and business disputes dressed up as cheating are the classic case.
Not by itself, and this is where a great deal of money is wasted. Whether an allegation is true is what a trial decides. A quashing petition succeeds on what the FIR itself does or does not say, on an express legal bar, on documents that cannot be disputed, or on a settlement — not on your version being better than theirs.
Yes — but only through the High Court. Compounding before the trial court is available only for the offences listed in the compounding provision, and Section 85 is not in either list. Where the parties have settled, the route is a quashing petition to the High Court under Section 528. The Supreme Court held in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) that quashing on a settlement and compounding are two different things, and that the High Court's power is not limited by the compounding list.
Those with a predominantly civil or personal flavour, and offences arising out of matrimony and family disputes — which is why matrimonial cases are routinely quashed on settlement. Courts will not quash serious offences against society on a settlement: murder, rape, dacoity, offences showing mental depravity, corruption, and economic offences affecting the public at large.
From orders passed in these matters: a written settlement; evidence that it has actually been performed, not merely signed; the decree of divorce by mutual consent where the parties have separated; both sides present and identified by the investigating officer; the complainant's own statement that she does not wish to pursue the case; and a finding that the settlement was free and without coercion.
The complainant is generally expected in person. Orders show co-petitioners — typically in-laws living outside Delhi — joining by video conferencing while the main parties attend in court. Confirm the position for your matter with your advocate before anyone books a ticket.
There is no fixed tariff. Many settlement quashings are allowed without costs. In some orders the court has directed a modest deposit with the Delhi State Legal Services Authority. Where the court has found that it was misled, costs have been heavy — in one 2026 matter a petition was dismissed with exemplary costs where the parties had concealed a subsisting marriage from the Family Court.
No, and courts have become noticeably more careful. The Supreme Court has restored a prosecution that a High Court had quashed, has warned against treating quashing as an ordinary rule, and has directed High Courts to satisfy themselves that a settlement is genuine — including by requiring the victim's presence. An unperformed settlement is refused.
No. The section says "the High Court", and nothing in the BNSS gives inherent powers to any court below it. What the trial courts can do is different — discharge you, or stop the proceedings — and those are separate provisions with their own tests.
Discharge is an application to the trial court saying that even on the prosecution's own material there is no ground to proceed. It comes after the charge-sheet, before charges are framed. Its provisions differ by the type of case — sessions trial, warrant case on a police report, warrant case otherwise. It is often the cheaper and more realistic route, and an advocate should tell you honestly which of the two fits your matter.
A CRL.M.C. — a criminal miscellaneous main petition. The State, through the Government of NCT of Delhi, is the first respondent and the complainant is the second. The prayer is to quash the numbered FIR and all proceedings emanating from it.
Ordinarily no. Successive petitions on the same grounds are discouraged and the Supreme Court has said so. A genuinely changed circumstance — a settlement reached afterwards, for instance — is a different matter, and is for your advocate to assess.
Not as a matter of course. The Supreme Court has cautioned against blanket "no coercive steps" orders passed without reasons in quashing petitions. Protection from arrest has its own provision — anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS — and that is usually the correct application to make.
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